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손학규 상임고문 UC Berkeley 특강 '동북아 지역 질서의 변화와 한미 관계'
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The Changing Regional Order in East Asia and the Korea-U.S. Relations 

Sohn Hak Kyu
January 31, 2014
UC Berkeley

   

I am highly honoured to give a lecture before the students and faculty members of this prestigious UC Berkeley today. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor John Lie, Chair of the Center for Korean Studies for inviting me to this lecture. I am also indebted to Mr. Dylan Davis, Program Director of the Center and other staff members for their support for my visit. Needless to say my thanks go to the students and scholars who spare their precious time to attend this lecture.

Under the title of my lecture, 'Changing Dynamics in East Asia and Korean Politics,' I will focus on the Korea-US relations, and particularly on the US's role in the changing regional order in East Asia. 

We are living in an 'era of grand transition.' The global order has undergone a great change from two perspectives. One is the massive global disruption caused by economic and political changes: constant threat by terrors and regional disputes, and the failure of the capitalist market economy triggered by the financial and fiscal crises. The other is the global power transition taking place in the course of the rise of China in particular. 

These disruption and power transitions bring about the era of multi-polar or multi-partner system, which shapes a new global order. The rise of China is a crucial aspect of the global transition. It has moved the pillar of the world economy from Trans-Atlantic to Trans-Pacific. It may bring about the era of Asia in concurrence of the emergence of the G2 of the US and China. Some people even envisage the emergence of the new civilisation in East Asia.

Along with the grand transition of the Global order, however, the security order in Northeast Asia, established after the WWII, has basically remained intact even after the end of the Cold War. This contrasts sharply with the parallel end of the global and regional Cold War in Europe. Today's East Asian regional security order is characterized by a lingering rivalry between the maritime forces (the United States, Japan, and Korea) on the one hand and continental forces (China, Russia, and North Korea) on the other. Among the continental forces, China has emerged as the major power, replacing the former Soviet Union. Among the maritime forces, Japan has maintained its status as the United States' closest regional ally.  

Against this backdrop, the Korean peninsula, as a frontline between these two forces, has witnessed an ever-growing gap between South and North Korea in terms of social, economic, and political development. Few now question the inevitability of South Korea's leading role in shaping the future of the Korean peninsula.

North Korea has been preoccupied with missile and nuclear development, based on the flawed notion that they can somehow make up for its economic backwardness and inferior conventional military capability. The alarming progress made in its missile and nuclear capabilities has been the primary cause of instability and arms race in Northeast Asia.

Under these circumstances, China and the United States are building a so-called "new type of great power relations," aiming to maintain and manage the status quo. At the same time, the United States has tried to address fiscal pressures to curtail defense spending by turning to allied burden sharing with Japan and Korea. While the rise of China in the last decade has made Japan feel insecure and apprehensive, it has not been able to address those concerns effectively.

But the rise of China, the formation of a "new type of great power relations" between China and the United States, and the American demand for increased defense burden sharing are emboldening Japan's claim to the right to becoming a "normal state." While there are various opinions within Japan, they do seem to converge around the need to relieve itself from the restrictions imposed on the use of military power in the peace constitution and seek a stronger military role.

By visiting the Yasukuni Shrine that commemorates "Class A" war criminals, the Japanese Prime Minister acted in denial of Japanese war atrocities and rejected the postwar order. The more significant underlying implication is that Japan will not tolerate a regional order led by the United States and China. The Abe cabinet is expected to do everything it can to exercise military self-defense and revise the constitution.

Against this backdrop, important changes are taking place in the East Asian regional order. The rise of China and the resurgence of Sinocentrism, the instability of the American "rebalance" policy towards Asia, the strengthening of Japanese military power, and North Korea's nuclear capability and regime instability are central to the present changes in the regional security environment. These changes could evolve in a constructive direction. It is also possible, however, that the confluence of Sino-American tensions, Sino-Japanese clashes, and disorder on the Korean peninsula could further complicate the situation.

For the last sixty years, the ROK-U.S. alliance has played a decisive role in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It is now time for the alliance to go beyond the present role of maintaining the status quo and assume the additional responsibility of establishing a future order for managing change and achieving peace and common prosperity.

First, the ROK-U.S alliance must facilitate cooperation rather than provoke confrontation. The South Korean people do not wish to see the United States and China engaged in conflict on or around the Korean peninsula. South Korea and the United States have established a military alliance, which is the closest form of inter-state relations. The "strategic partnership" between South Korea and China is, in real terms, merely declaratory in military aspect. This concept is rather more of significance in economic aspect, for China has become the largest economic partner from the Korean perspectives.

The South Korean people do not wish to be forced to take sides between the United States and China in this context. In this respect, Vice President Biden's comment, "It's never been a good bet to bet against America" may drive South Koreans into an uncomfortable position. Koreans would want to see the cooperative relations between two countries rather than confrontation and conflict. In the same vein, South Korea wants to see the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) promote regional economic cooperation rather than set up barriers to free trade and investment. Therefore, from the South Korean perspective, a better economic relationship between US and China such as FTA will be desirable if China's inclusion in the TPP is unrealistic in the present situation.

Second, South Korea and the United States must cooperate to ensure that Japan's pursuit of a "normal state" does not precipitate an arms race in the Asia Pacific region. Japan refuses to accept responsibility for war crimes and has the perception that its only mistake was losing the war. Incidentally, Japan seemingly falsifies herself as a victim rather than a perpetrator of the war, simply by the fact that they were attacked nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is not merely a problem of historical interpretation; it portends a dangerous future because Japanese actions could catalyze Chinese nationalism and militarism to come together. These clashing views between China and Japan could potentially heighten tensions in the region. South Korea, Japan, and the United States must cooperate on a wide range of issues based on the shared values of democracy and market economy.

But such trilateral cooperation cannot progress in earnest until Japan disassociates itself from its past wrong-doings. How the United States will address this problem is becoming an important question for its diplomacy in the region. In this respect, US's official position on the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine expressed by the US Embassy in Tokyo just after the visit was quite appropriate. In the same vein, the legislation of the budget law that included the clause on 'comfort woman' was also conceived positive in the role of the US with regard to peace and cooperation in the region.

Third, South Korea and the United States must attempt a new approach to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, a key challenge to the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability in Northeast Asia. The majority of the South Korean people feel that the United States is more focused on preventing the proliferation of North Korea's nuclear danger rather than achieve denuclearization. This policy cannot have any effect on changing the current situation as long as South Korea remains North Korea's nuclear hostage. The United States must understand that the South Korean people will not tolerate such danger indefinitely.

The United States may at some point have to think about the basic structure of the security regime in the Korean peninsula. Peace regime is constructed on the basis of either coercive and military measure or mutual recognition and coexistence. South and North Korea together entered into the UN in 1991. South Korea established diplomatic relations with China and USSR in 1992 and 1990 respectively. West Germany and the USSR normalised their relationship in 1955; the US and East Germany in 1975. North Korea is the only country not to have been realised by the US after the WW II.

What the US and South Korea must do is to 'normalise the abnormal.' Although North Korea cannot be categorised as a normal state, it should be recognised as a real entity in the international community in order for the normal states to deal with the abnormal more effectively. The process for the establishment of the US-NK diplomatic relations, of course, should go together with the denuclearisation process. The normalisation of US-NK relations will require many steps before actually reaching the final goal. However, this process will certainly provide the ground to the establishment of the peace regime which in turn would eventually dismantle nuclear weapons in North Korea.

Fourth, South Korea and the United States must employ political and diplomatic assets in building a multilateral regional security dialogue in Northeast Asia. Such dialogue will be an important complementary measure for the United States to manage its relations with China and Japan in a stable manner. From South Korea's perspective, it will be useful for bringing North Korea to the right side of history and make its security environment more peaceful. It is important to note that the United States' "Pivot to Asia" policy is giving the impression of relying too much on military means. American efforts to encourage multilateral dialogue and cooperation will show that its policy of rebalancing is genuinely a balanced position.

All of these efforts are mutually complementary. They require both Seoul and Washington to adapt to the changing security environment. Such a proactive development will be crucial in ensuring the vitality and longevity of the Korea-US relations.

Under these circumstances, 'unification' has become the major topic in the Korean society from the beginning of the year. It was triggered by the popular and sensational wording by President Park Geun Hye, which is, 'Unification is a jackpot." In addition, the conservative Chosun Ilbo has launched a grand campaign for unification as its major project of the year.

These campaigns have not come out by coincidence. The circumstances and conditions were there. The instability of North Korea caused by, or found out by, the execution of Jang Song-Taek, Kim Jong-Un's Uncle, seems to be the major motivation of these movements. This situation encourages the people, especially the conservative people, to anticipate the possibility of a 'sudden change' or, bluntly put, the 'sudden collapse' of the North Korean Regime.

Unification certainly is a jackpot. Unification will bring tremendous economic benefits both to South and North Koreas, and indeed, to the Unified Korea and surrounding countries. A sudden collapse may come about. The instability and the weakness of the North Korean Regime may bring about the situation.

But, what should we do to meet the situation of sudden collapse of the North, should it really happen? Strengthen military capability? Expand police power to handle the social disorder? Increase budgets to accomodate refugees? Prepare legal devices to deal with the property disputes?

Fine. They are necessary as contingency plans for the extraordinary and emergency situation. However, what we really need to prepare is the peaceful transition of power. We need to build up the economic community in the Korean peninsula. We need economic cooperation with the North for this purpose. We want to see openness and reform of the North Korean society to this end. That is why we want to build up a peace mechanism, and why, for that purpose, we want to open a dialogue.

The sudden change may or may not come about. But what is clear is that we must not repeat the mistakes of the coercive policy of the past administration based upon the assumption of the early collapse of the North Korean Regime.

What we have to do is to induce North Korea into openness and reform. Already there is a trend of the expansion of market economy in North Korea, though in restricted scale. The rapid increase of mobile phones is another phenomenon. Signs of change in North Korea are obvious.

The reason why the North is aggressive is not that they have the strength but that they want to desperately escape from isolation. The repeated open suggestion made by the North from the beginning of this year for the improvement of the South-North relations is another expression of the situation.

We have to be endurant. We must not hurry. The core task is how to pull North Korea constructively into the security regime of Northeast Asia. We already have a solidly established system of control of North Korea through ROK-US Alliance and ROK-China Strategic Partnership. It is desirable to refrain from the coercive bargaining by the 'peace through strength' strategy. Reassurance of security concerns through friendly persuasion rather than compulsion is important and useful.

In this respect, I would like to advise the Korean government to lift the May 24 Measure as a sign of rapprochement. This is the road to North Korea's openness and reform. The fact that the conservative but moderate Joongang Ilbo made the same suggestion at the beginning of the year implies the need for the change of policy in this regard.

I would also like to propose to the US government to more positively engage in the dialogue initiative. President Obama may ask President Clinton to visit Pyongyang as a special envoy. His mission may or may not be for the release of Kenneth Bae, whom the North Korea has already shown the intension. The important thing is that the US shows its earnestness to respond to the desire of the North for the improvement of the relations with the US and the South.

I am well aware of the negative sentiment of the American public with regard to the engagement with North Korea. They remember with regret that Clinton's visit to Pyongyang in August 2009 did not bring about real progress in the relations between the two countries apart from bringing back two journalists arrested in North Korea. The general atmosphere of both the US and South Korea is certainly against the dialogue and lenient policy according to the unpleasant experience with North Korea like this case. But we must believe that the continuation of efforts to bring the North onto the table will eventually make progress.

Furthermore, the conservative and hard-line position is dominant under the situation where, they think, the collapse of the North Korean regime seems imminent. But, even if their speculation is correct, this is really the appropriate time for the political leadership of both countries to take the peace initiative, for we want a peaceful and stable transition, not disruption and destruction of the prosperity, to be obtained through unification. The present situation surrounding Korean peninsula reminds me of the famous remarks of Egon Bahr, the architect of the Ost-Politik of Billy Brant, "Changes by Rapproachment."

Epilogue

Since I am in the San Francisco Bay Area, I would like to utilise this opportunity to remind the US government of a significant background of the Dokdo Island question with regard to San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.

The Dokdo dispute has been developed to the extent that the Japanese Prime Minister recently mentioned that Japan would consider submitting the case unilaterally to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

One of the main rationale of Japan's assertion of Dokdo as their territory is, as appeared in their foreign ministry website, that Allied Powers agreed with their territorial claim in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

In the original draft up to the 5th revision of the treaty, Dokdo, or the Liancourt Rocks, was included in the list of the occupied territories that Japan must cede back to the Republic of Korea. The 6th draft, however, in accordance with the insistence of the US government, inexplicably switched the stance towards Dokdo remaining under Japanese control.

To note historical facts, in addition to the long historical ownership of Dokdo Island, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) Instruction #677 of January 29, 1946, listed the Liancourt Rocks, along with many other islands, as part of those territories over which Japanese administration was to be suspended.

Then, the SCAP transferred its jurisdiction to the United States Army Military Government on January 29, 1946. The U.S. Military Government in Korea, in turn, transferred all jurisdictions over Dokdo, the Liancourt Rocks, to the government of the Republic of Korea when it became fully independent and sovereign on August 15th, 1948.

In accordance with such US policy line President Rhee Sungman’s announcement of the Peace Line enforced Korea's territorial title to Dokdo.

Therefore, with the blessing of the United States as reflected under the aforementioned steps, there should not have been any questions regarding the Korean sovereignty over Dokdo.

This historical background being clear, I do not understand what happened between the 5th and 6th drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in which US concluded Dokdo should remain in the hands of Japan. What has changed the US's stance on the Dokdo issue between the August 15, 1945, and December 29, 1949? What historical facts did US rely on in the sudden change on this issue? We Koreans have yet to see any legitimate historical evidence to back up US's stance. We want to see the US take a clear position on this question. <End>